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PRE-MARKMAN REVERSAL RATES
David L. Schwartz*
The decisions in Markman v. Westview Instruments by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court shifted the
responsibility for construing claims from jury to judge, and the Federal
Circuit's decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., adopted a
de novo standard of review on appeal. These decisions were motivated
in part to bring stability, predictability, and transparency to the claim
construction process. The Federal Circuit's reversal rate, which has
hovered between 20 and 45 percent, has prompted calls for significant
changes. These proposals are premised on the notion that the claim
construction reversal rate is unduly high because of fundamental
features of the appellate review process, such as the standard of review,
the scope ofjudicial authority over claim interpretation, and the canons
of claim interpretation. This Article, which is part of a symposium on
"The Federal Circuit as an Institution, "provides data from all Federal
Circuit opinions from 1991 through 2008 to determine whether changes
in the procedure for construing and reviewing claims has changed the
reversal rate.
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PRE-MARKMAN REVERSAL RA TES
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit's ostensibly high reversal rate of claim
construction decisions by the district courts has been well
documented and widely publicized. Academics have intensively
studied the claim construction reversal rate, both anecdotally and
empirically. District court judges openly complain about it. Even the
Federal Circuit itself has noted the criticism over the perceived high
reversal rate.
The Federal Circuit's reversal rate-which has hovered between
20 and 45 percent-has driven calls for several significant changes,
including providing interlocutory review of claim construction
decisions and shifting from a de novo standard of review to a
deferential one. These proposals are premised on the notion that the
claim construction reversal rate is unduly high because of
fundamental features of the appellate review process, such as the
standard of review, the scope of judicial authority over claim
interpretation, and the canons of claim interpretation.
Many of these factors can be traced to both the Federal
Circuit's' and the Supreme Court's 2 decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, which placed all of the responsibility for
construing claims with judges,' and the Federal Circuit's decision in
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,4 which adopted a de novo
standard of review on appeal.' These decisions were motivated in
part to bring stability, predictability, and transparency to the claim
construction process.6
But were these objectives achieved? In particular, how does the
current reversal rate compare with the rate before Markman and
Cybor? Examining the pre-Markman and pre-Cybor cases provides
an important natural experiment to determine whether changes in the
procedure for construing and reviewing claims changed the reversal
rate. Relying upon data from all Federal Circuit opinions from 1991
1. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
2. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
3. Id. at 391.
4. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
5. Id. at 1456.
6. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390-91; Cybor, F.3d at 1455.
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through 2008-which includes cases from several years before
Markman and Cybor-this Article reports the reversal rate before
and after Markman and Cybor. It also discusses the reversal rate for
appeals decided under the deferential standard of review used in the
mid-i 990s.
This Article is a contribution to the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review's symposium "The Federal Circuit as an Institution." It is
part of a larger project evaluating the success of Markman and
provides descriptive information about reversal rates.
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part I explains the
background law and procedure involving patent claim construction.
In so doing, the Article describes the important shift from jury to
judge that occurred via Markman. The current role of claim
construction in patent litigation is also described. Additionally, Part I
explains the controversy surrounding the level of deference-
currently none-that the Federal Circuit gives claim constructions by
district court judges. Part II explains the empirical study that
underlies the data presented here and elaborates on the methodology
employed. Part III describes the empirical results, reporting the
reversal rates before and after Markman, as well as the rates under
the two standards of appellate review. Part IV discusses the
significance of the findings. Part V provides some brief remarks
about selection effects theory in the context of patent litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
Claim construction is the process of interpreting the scope of a
patent. This part first sets forth the basics of claim construction. It
then traces the evolution of the law of claim construction during the
1990s, including the reallocation in Markman of responsibility from
the jury to the judge and the confirmation in Cybor that claim
construction is reviewed de novo.
A. The Law of Claim Construction
Every patent must contain at least one claim.' The claims set
forth the outer boundaries of the patentee's right to exclude others
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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from certain activities such as manufacturing products.' The claims
are written in a technical manner and must comply with detailed
formatting and structural rules.' In addition, the claims must describe
an invention that satisfies the patentability requirements, including
that the claimed invention is novel and nonobvious.'o
Typically, inventors, their patent attorneys, and the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) carefully consider the language of
claims." The USPTO often finds claims unpatentable based on any
number of grounds: because they are indefinite, because they do not
sufficiently set forth the patent's boundaries, because they are
anticipated or obvious in light of the prior art, or because they are
unsupported by the patent's disclosure.12 In many instances, the
patent applicant alters the claim language in an attempt to obtain
allowance of the patent."
Patent claim construction is the process of interpreting what the
words and terms in an issued patent claim mean. Claim construction
occurs in a variety of contexts, such as when the USPTO is
considering whether to allow the claims. 4 It also occurs in patent
litigation in the federal district courts, the International Trade
Commission," and the Court of Federal Claims.16 This Article
8. See id. § 271; Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 719,
731 (2009) ("[C]laiming communicates the set to the public to encourage efficient investment in
the invention, by requiring licensing or abstinence from the set's embodiments and by permitting
free use of embodiments not in the set.").
9. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (8th ed., rev. July 2008) [hereinafter MPEP].
10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
11. Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 186 (2006) (arguing that the
USPTO should focus even more on expressly defining claim scope). Former Chief Judge Giles
Rich once stated, "[T]he name of the game is the claim." Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and
Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
497, 499 (1990) (emphasis omitted). See generally ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS
OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (5th ed. 2008) (discussing claim drafting).
12. See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179, 183-84 (2007).
13. See, e.g., In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Alternatively, applicants
can argue that the claim is patentable as presented. See MPEP, supra note 9, § 707.07(f).
14. Risch, supra note 12, at 182-84.
15. For an interesting discussion of why litigants may choose to bring suit in the
International Trade Commission, see Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical
Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63
(2008) (analyzing patent disputes filed in the International Trade Commission and district courts).
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focuses exclusively on patent claim construction in litigation in the
district courts, where the bulk of patent litigation occurs. 7
Patent litigation is an adversarial process in which a patentee
accuses another of infringing a patent.'" To prevail, the patentee must
prove infringement and defeat any defenses raised by the accused
infringer, including invalidity and unenforceability." The process for
proving infringement is simple, at least in theory. The first step is to
construe the patent claim at issue in order to determine its scope.20
The second step is to compare the properly construed patent claim
with the accused device or method.2' If each and every element
recited in the patent claim is literally or equivalently found in the
accused device or method, there is infringement.22
Because claim construction is the necessary first step in the
patent infringement analysis,2 3 it is an issue in almost all patent
16. The Court of Federal Claims hears patent infringement suits brought against the U.S.
government. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).
17. The interpretation used by the USPTO is arguably different from the interpretation used
in litigation. The USPTO's broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard allows it to truly test the
reach of the claims vis-A-vis the prior art. Furthermore, during pendency at the USPTO, there
generally is little or no prosecution history to rely upon, so that the tool of claim construction
frequently used by the district courts in litigation is unavailable. See MPEP, supra note 9, § 2111;
see also Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent
Office's "Broadest Reasonable Interpretation" Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285 (2009); Risch,
supra note 12, 182-84.
18. Most suits are brought by the patentee, but some are brought as declaratory judgment
actions by an accused infringer. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The largest share of patent litigation
involves large corporations as both plaintiffs and defendants. See Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P.
Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and
Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation (Univ. Ill. Law & Econs. Research Paper No. LEO9-005,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1337166; Colleen V.
Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-
Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1603 (2009).
19. Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time
Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 189 (2001).
20. General Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
21. Id.
22. A patentee can prove infringement either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. If
an accused device or method does not literally contain a required element, infringement may still
be found if the accused device or method contains an equivalent. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
23. State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ("[W]e have held that a claim 'must be construed before determining its validity, just as it
is first construed before deciding infringement."' (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc))).
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lawsuits. 24 Not only is claim construction an issue, but the parties
almost always dispute the proper interpretation of the patent claims."
In fact, there are often disputes as to the meaning of numerous claim
terms. 26  And these claim construction disputes are frequently
dispositive of the issue of infringement.27 In other words, once the
claims have been interpreted, it is often apparent whether the device
or method infringes. Claim construction is also a necessary step in
evaluating several defenses to patent infringement. For example,
claim construction must be considered in determining whether the
claim is invalid as anticipated or obvious in light of the prior art.28
While it may at first blush seem simple to interpret patent
claims, it is anything but." The words used in the patent are often
susceptible to several different meanings.30 To assist in claim
construction, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor courts have
articulated the claim construction doctrine in the form of various
canons of construction. These canons are used to decide how to
define terms in the patent claim."
Perhaps the most basic canon of claim construction is that claim
terms are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning as
understood by a person in the field of technology at the time the
invention was made.32 Yet another canon, known as the doctrine of
claim differentiation, states that two separate claims in a single
24. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1751 (2009).
25. Id. (stating that "there is essentially always a dispute over the meaning of the patent
claims"); see also PETER S. MENELL, LYNN H. PASAHOW, JAMES POOLEY & MATTHEW D.
POWERS, PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-3 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/library/
fjc catalog.nsf/autoframepage!openform&url=/library/fjc-catalog.nsf/DPublication!openform&p
arentunid=C80239D6A4DD70D7852575F4005B23CD ("The construction of patent claims plays
a critical role in nearly every patent case.").
26. Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1744.
27. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer,
J., concurring) (stating that "to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case").
28. State Contracting & Eng'g Corp., 346 F.3d at 1067 (stating that claims must be
construed before evaluating validity).
29. EDWARD D. MANZO, CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.2 (2009).
30. Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525 (2010)
(discussing the vagueness of the boundaries of patent claims).
31. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 144-46 (2005).
32. Id. at 145.
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patent should not be interpreted as having identical scope." Another
canon, that a claim should be construed to preserve its validity, urges
that claims not be interpreted so broadly that they would be obvious
or anticipated in light of the prior art.34 Patentees are also permitted
to be their own lexicographers." This means that patentees can
define words in any manner they desire, even if the definition is
contrary to how people in the field understand the words.36
The application of these canons often leads to multiple possible
constructions of a given term in a patent. The judge must consider all
of the canons in the context of the patent and use her best judgment
to decide which construction is correct.
An intracircuit split arose over the claim construction doctrine in
the early 2000s. Some of the Federal Circuit judges believed that
claim construction should be accomplished by first resorting to the
dictionary.37 Other judges felt that this approach was incorrect and
contended that claim construction should focus on "intrinsic
evidence," namely, the claims, specification, and prosecution
history." After several years of disagreement, the Federal Circuit
attempted to clarify the claim construction doctrine in Phillips v.
A WH Corp. by rejecting the dictionary approach." But while most
Federal Circuit judges nominally agreed upon the same general
methodology in Phillips, in that case and cases since then, there has
been notable disagreement over how to actually construe a specific
claim's disputed terms in a given case.40 In other words, different
Federal Circuit judges will read the same patent specification and
claim, yet will often arrive at opposite conclusions from district court
33. See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
34. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
35. See MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 476 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007); K-2 Corp.
v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("As we have repeatedly said, a patentee
can be his own lexicographer provided the patentee's definition, to the extent it differs from the
conventional definition, is clearly set forth in the specification." (internal citations omitted)).
36. See MyMail, Ltd., 476 F.3d at 1376.
37. Tex. Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
38. Id. at 1203.
39. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
40. Id. at 1332-33; see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding?: An Empirical Assessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(2004) (noting two distinct methods for construing claims used by Federal Circuit judges).
1080
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judges and one another as to the claim's meaning.4 1 In general, there
has been little evidence that Phillips had a "significant impact on the
stability and predictability of the Federal Circuit's claim construction
jurisprudence."42
B. Markman I and Markman II
Claim construction in patent cases in the early 1990s was
conducted with the same canons of construction used today.
However, in many cases tried in the early 1990s, the jury construed
patent claims.43 When a jury was demanded and a case reached trial,
the jury was allowed to hear all of the evidence and determine claim
construction and infringement claims. Basically, the parties
presented their proposed claim constructions and the evidence of
whether the accused device met the claim limitations. The judge then
instructed the jury as to the canons of construction and applicable
law. The jury thereafter deliberated and determined who won. In
these cases, the role of the judge was limited to posttrial relief such
as deciding motions for judgment as a matter of law.
The responsibility for claim construction was reallocated to the
judge as a result of a pair of decisions involving a patent held by
Herbert Markman. Markman was the named inventor of United
States Reissue Patent No. 33,054 (the "'054 patent"), which was
directed to an inventory control system for use in dry-cleaning
stores. 44 Markman's system was "capable of monitoring and
reporting upon the status, location and throughput of inventory in an
establishment."" The invention purportedly provided for monitoring
"the progress of articles through the laundry and drycleaning system"
and permitted the inventory to be "reconcile[d] at any point in the
sequence" of sorting, cleaning, and unsorting clothing.46
41. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 40, at 1111-12.
42. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?: Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Jurisprudence 26 (Mar. 30, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.chicagoip.com/wagner.pdf
43. Jeffrey Peabody, Under Construction: Towards a More Deferential Standard of Review
in Claim Construction Cases, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 505, 506 (2008) ("Prior to 1995, claim
construction issues were typically decided by the jury.").
44. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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In 1991, Markman and his licensee brought suit against
Westview Instruments and another accused infringer.4 7 A key
disputed term in Markman's patent was "inventory."48 Markman
contended that "inventory" covered transaction totals or dollars.49
Westview countered that "inventory" meant "articles of clothing.""
The case proceeded to a jury trial on the issue of infringement. The
court instructed the jury to determine the meaning of the claim
"using the relevant patent documents including the specifications, the
drawings and the file histories."" The court also instructed the jury to
determine whether Westview's device was an infringement.5 2 After
deliberating, the jury found that Westview infringed the . '054
patent.53 Subsequent to the jury verdict, the trial court granted
Westview's motion for judgment as a matter of law.54 The court
stated that claim construction was a matter of law for the judge, not
the jury, to decide." In so doing, the court adopted Westview's
construction of the term "inventory" and held that it did not
infringe.56
Markman appealed the judgment and argued that the trial court
erred in granting the judgment as a matter of law. 7 Specifically,
Markman contended that it was proper for the jury to interpret the
meaning of terms of a patent. In late 1993, after the appeal was
argued before a panel, the Federal Circuit, sua sponte, ordered an en
banc rehearing of the case." On April 5, 1995, the Federal Circuit
issued its ruling in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
(Markman 1)."
47. Id at 972.
48. Id. at 972-73.
49. Id. at 974.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 973.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 973-74.
59. Id at 970 n.1.
60. Id. at 967.
1082
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In Markman I, a majority of the Federal Circuit judges shifted
the responsibility for claim construction away from the jury and to
the judge as a matter of law reserved exclusively for the court.6' The
majority stated that there were two lines of cases in Federal Circuit
claim construction precedent.62 The first line stated that "claim
construction may have underlying factual inquiries that must be
submitted to a jury."" The second line held that claim construction
"is strictly a question of law for the court."' The Federal Circuit
found that the first line-asserting that there was a factual
component in claim construction-did not have a firm basis in
Federal Circuit precedent." Moreover, the majority argued that
Supreme Court precedent firmly held that claim construction was a
matter of law exclusively for the court.66 Separately, issues of
fairness and the patent statutory scheme required that competitors be
able to reasonably ascertain the scope of the patentee's exclusive
rights.67 Finally, the court held that the construction of all written
documents, including patents in particular, is reserved for the court.68
Based on these considerations, the Markman I majority adopted a
clear rule that claim construction is a matter of law to be determined
by the court." Further, since construction is a matter of law, the
Federal Circuit held that lower court decisions are to be "reviewed de
novo on appeal."70
Arguing that the decision had seized power reserved for the jury,
three judges declined to join the Federal Circuit majority opinion.
Judges Mayer and Rader concurred in the judgment, while Judge
Newman dissented." According to Judge Mayer, the majority
opinion "usurp[ed] a major part of the functions of both trial judge
and jury in patent cases, obliterating the traditional, defined
61. See id. at 979.
62. See id. at 976-77.
63. Id. at 976.
64. Id. at 977.
65. Id. at 976-77.
66. Id. at 977-78.
67. Id. at 978.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 979.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 989, 998-99 (Mayer, J. and Rader, J., concurring; Newman, J., dissenting).
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differences between the roles of judge and jury, and trial and
appellate courts." 72 The majority's holding, he argued, violated the
Seventh Amendment.
Judge Mayer concurred that claim construction as a whole
should be reviewed de novo.74 However, Judge Mayer argued that
"any facts found in the course of interpreting the claims must be
subject to the same standard by which we review any other factual
determinations: for clear error in facts found by a court; for
substantial evidence to support a jury's verdict."7 ' He asserted that
the majority's reading of the lines of claim construction cases in the
Federal Circuit and at the Supreme Court was incorrect.7 6
In her dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority was
wrong to affirm because the decision violated the Seventh
Amendment's right to a jury trial. She also argued that the majority
had misconstrued the applicable Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
precedents on claim construction."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and subsequently affirmed
the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc. (Markman II).79 Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous court,
confirmed that claim construction is "exclusively within the province
of the court."" His opinion focused on the Seventh Amendment
concern raised by the Federal Circuit concurrences and dissent. After
acknowledging that patent infringement cases must be tried by a
jury, Justice Souter analyzed whether the "substance of the common-
law right of trial by jury" was implicated by claim construction.'
72. Id. at 992 (Mayer, J., concurring).
73. Id. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
74. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 989-90, 993-95.
77. Id. at 1000 (Newman, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 999, 1002.
79. 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
80. Id. at 372.
81. Id. at 377 (internal citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court precedent roughly considered issues of fact to be
for the jury and issues of law to be for the judge.82 However, Justice
Souter did not place claim construction within either category.
Instead, he called it "a mongrel practice."" After determining that no
Supreme Court precedent decided the issue, he elected to "consider
both the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the
statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation."84 He
found that judges are more likely to properly construe a written
instrument. For these reasons, the Supreme Court found that claim
construction is an issue for the judge.8 6
However, the Supreme Court was silent on the standard of
appellate review. It did not opine whether the standard of review was
de novo, as the Federal Circuit held in Markman L Hence, the
standard of review issue was not entirely settled. Markman I held
that claim construction was to be reviewed de novo, but Markman II
was silent on this point. A majority of Federal Circuit claim
construction opinions issued in the years immediately following
Markman II found that claim construction was to be reviewed de
novo." Nonetheless, a minority of opinions concluded that there was
a factual component to claim construction, and those facts were
reviewed with deference."
C. Cybor and Confirmation ofDe Novo Appellate Review
In 1998, the Federal Circuit considered the appropriate level of
review en banc in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc. The
majority, after reciting the Supreme Court's analysis in Markman II,
82. See id. at 384 n.10.
83. Id. at 378.
84. Id. at 384.
85. Id. at 388.
86. Id. at 390.
87. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc. 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane) (citing
Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo
Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1996); General Am. Transp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d
766, 769 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1105
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
88. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
114 F.3d 1547, 1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1586 (Mayer, J., concurring);
Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Wiener v. NEC Elecs. Inc.,
102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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held that claim construction is purely a matter of law and is to be
reviewed by the Federal Circuit de novo." It also stated that the
Supreme Court's description of claim construction as a "mongrel
practice" was merely a "prefatory comment" and did not support the
position that claim construction has underlying factual questions."
Judges Plager, Bryson, and Mayer concurred in the judgment,
each writing separately." While agreeing that claim construction
should be reviewed de novo, Judge Plager indicated that informal
deference should be provided.9 2 Indeed, his concurrence noted that
"common sense dictates that the trial judge's view will carry
weight."9 3 Judge Bryson wrote a second concurrence underscoring
that he would provide weight to the district court's claim
construction, notwithstanding the de novo review standard.94
Judge Mayer also penned a concurrence, joined by Judge
Newman.9 5 He argued that the Supreme Court in Markman II could
have easily affirmed the de novo standard of Markman L96 However,
the Supreme Court chose not to do so.97 And in choosing not to, the
Supreme Court discussed claim construction as a practice that was
not clearly either pure law or pure fact." Noting that the Court called
it a "mongrel practice,"" Judge Mayer argued that in some cases
"there are factual determinations that are more than just incident to
claim construction.""oo In these cases, he argued, some formal
deference should be provided to the factual findings of the district
court judge.10
89. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451.
90. Id. at 1455.
91. Id. at 1462-63.
92. Id. at 1462.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1463.
95. Id. (Newman, J., joining Mayer, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1464.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1464 n.1.
100. Id. at 1464.
101. Id. at 1465.
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Judge Rader also dissented in part, arguing that Markman I
required numerous deviations from normal litigation procedure.'0 2
These deviations included a "[b]ias toward summary judgment[],"
shifting claim construction theories before trial, and the risk of
multiple trials if the Federal Circuit reversed a district court's claim
construction.' 3 Judge Rader argued that de novo appellate review of
claim construction undercuts the benefits of having judges construe
claims.'" He provided his own statistics supporting a high reversal
rate for claim constructions.' More specifically, Judge Rader noted
that from Markman I until Cybor, the Federal Circuit had expressly
reviewed 141 claim construction decisions and reversed "in whole or
in part" 38.3 percent of them.' 6 Limiting the analysis to claim
constructions from the district courts or the Court of Federal Claims,
Judge Rader cited a reversal rate of 37.3 percent.' 7 According to
Judge Rader, a reversal rate of that magnitude undermined Markman
I's goals of predictability and certainty.'s
Judge Newman wrote a separate opinion with additional
views-in which Judge Mayer joined-arguing that the way the
Federal Circuit implemented de novo review was problematic.'
First, Judge Newman noted that the Federal Circuit had not accepted
interlocutory review of district court judges' claim construction
orders."0 Thus, in order to reach an appealable judgment, a district
court must enter final judgment on infringement and all defenses or
rule on a preliminary injunction. Reaching an appealable judgment is
expensive, even after a Markman ruling."' Judge Newman also
criticized the "unexpectedly creative" claim constructions adopted by
102. Id. at 1474 n.2 (Rader, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1476.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1476 n.4.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1476.
109. Id. at 1478-79 (Mayer, J. joining Newman, J., additional views).
110. Id. at 1479. It should be noted that in the years since Cybor, the Federal Circuit has
almost never accepted an interlocutory review of a claim construction order. See, e.g., V. Ajay
Singh, Interlocutory Appeals in Patent Cases Under 28 US.C. § 1292(c)(2): Are They Still
Justified and Are They Implemented Correctly?, 55 DUKE L.J. 179, 196 (2005) ("[T]he Federal
Circuit has thus far refused to hear permissive appeals related to claim construction.").
111. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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some Federal Circuit panels."2 According to Judge Newman, these
claim constructions create unpredictability for litigants and add "a
sporting element" to the Federal Circuit."3
The standard of review relating to claim construction has been
vigorously debated since Cybor. There are numerous academic
criticisms of de novo appellate review of claim construction."14
Furthermore, on several occasions Congress has proposed mandating
interlocutory review of claim construction orders."'
The Federal Circuit may itself revisit the de novo standard of
review. In fact, the Federal Circuit requested briefing on the issue
during its en banc consideration of Phillips v. A WH Corp. in 2004."6
However, in the majority opinion in Phillips, the court declined to
address the issue "at this time."" In 2006, several judges on the
Federal Circuit expressed a willingness to revisit Cybor and de novo
review of district court judges' claim constructions."' The case,
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,l" involved an important
claim construction dispute in the context of generic drug litigation.'
Although the Federal Circuit denied a request for rehearing en
banc,12 1 several judges dissented from the denial, and all of the judges
112. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1479.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference,
94 VA. L. REV. 1165 (2008); David Krinsky, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and the Role of
Appellate Deference in Patent Claim Construction Appeals, 66 MD. L. REV. 194 (2006); Lauren
Maida, Patent Claim Construction: It's Not a Pure Matter of Law, So Why Isn't the Federal
Circuit Giving the District Courts the Deference They Deserve?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773
(2009); Peabody, supra note 43.
115. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted); S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 1908,
110th Cong. (2007); S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008).
116. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). The court
stated:
Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., . . . and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., . . . is it
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim
construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?
Id.
117. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Judges Mayer
and Newman dissented in part, stating that the court should overrule Cybor. See id. at 1330-31
(Newman, J., joining Mayer, J., dissenting).
118. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
119. 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
120. Id. at 1296.
121. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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who wrote separately indicated that they would eliminate or at least
revise the de novo standard. 12 2
II. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This Article relies upon a database of all published and
unpublished Federal Circuit claim construction decisions from 1991
through 2008. This section briefly describes the development and
scope of the database.
A few previous articles have used the core database used here,123
but the database has now been extended to include opinions from
January 1, 1991, to December 31, 2008. It contains all Federal
Circuit opinions resolving a disputed issue of claim construction
arising from district court litigation during that time period. The
database includes precedential and nonprecedential opinions, as well
as appeals resolved without a written opinion. Because a detailed
122. Judges Michel and Rader dissented, arguing that de novo review of claim construction
had caused four problems: (1) a consistently high reversal rate; (2) a lack of predictability; (3) the
loss of the district court judges' "comparative advantage" gained because they hear all of the
evidence; and (4) an overloading of the Federal Circuit's docket with appeals about minor claim
construction issues. Id. at 1040 (Michel, J., and Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Newman separately
dissented and criticized the claim construction methodology used by the original Federal Circuit
panel. Id. at 1041 (Newman, J., dissenting). She also stated that science-and-technology-based
facts in patent cases should receive the same standard of appellate review as other science-and-
technology-based cases under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Amgen,
469 F.3d at 1041, 1043. Judge Rader dissented, explicitly urging that the Federal Circuit provide
deference to factual components of a trial court's claim construction. Id. at 1044 (Rader, J.,
dissenting). Judge Moore also dissented and suggested that the Federal Circuit reconsider the de
novo review standard. Id. at 1046 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judges Gajarsa, Dyk, and Linn
concurred in the denial of en banc review but noted that their joining in a denial should not be
viewed as their unqualified agreement with Cybor. Rather, they wrote, Amgen was not the
appropriate case for en banc review of this issue. Id. at 1045 (Gajarsa, J., Dyk, J., and Linn, J.,
concurring). Judge Lourie also concurred in the denial of en banc review, despite agreeing that
the panel had incorrectly interpreted the patent claim at issue. He stated that the case did not
satisfy the requirements for en banc review. Id. at 1043 (Lourie, J., concurring). More recently,
district court judge Ronald Clark sitting on the Federal Circuit by designation, echoed concerns
about the de novo standard of review of claim construction. Trading Tech. Intern., Inc. v. eSpeed,
Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Clark J., concurring) ("[T]he current de novo
standard of review for claim construction may result in unintended consequences of discouraging
settlement, encouraging appeals, and in some cases, multiplying the proceedings.").
123. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International
Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2009) (relying on a database from
1996-2008) [hereinafter Schwartz, Courting Specialization]; David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect?: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 223, 238 (2008) (relying on a database from 1996-2007) [hereinafter Schwartz, Practice
Makes Perfect].
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explanation of how the original data set was derived is available
elsewhere, 2 4 it is not repeated here. The same general process was
undertaken to expand the data set.
However, there are two items worth mentioning about the patent
cases decided by the Federal Circuit before the Supreme Court's
decision in Markman II. First, juries construed the claims in some
cases. To account for this, the data set recorded whether a judge or
jury construed the claims for pre-Markman II decisions. After
Markman II, nearly all of the substantive Federal Circuit opinions on
claim construction have.been appeals from claim constructions by
judges.'25 Thus, the judge-jury distinction is not important after
Markman II.
Second, a fair number of appeals of patent claim construction
cases from the pre-Markman I period were decided by summary
affirmance.'26 Specifically, Federal Circuit Rule 36 ("Rule 36")
permits the court to resolve an appeal without a written opinion.27 If
the Federal Circuit decides a case via summary affirmance, the entire
Federal Circuit resolution consists of the word affirmed. Because
there is no written opinion, it is not immediately clear which issues
were appealed. For these cases, there are a number of techniques
available to determine whether claim construction was appealed.
These techniques include reviewing the appellate briefs (if
available), discussing the appeal with one of the attorneys involved,
analyzing reported district court decisions in the case, and reviewing
the district court docket. If the issue of the district court's claim
construction was raised on appeal, the case was considered relevant
to the database. Otherwise, the case was eliminated as irrelevant.'2 8
124. For a thorough discussion of the selection, coding, and reliability of the data set, see
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 269-74. The same general process was
undertaken to expand the data set.
125. A very few cases were tried to juries before Markman I but not decided on appeal until
after Markman H. For example, in B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, the entire case
was submitted to a jury in 1994, but the case was not decided by the Federal Circuit until 1997.
124 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Almost all other jury claim constructions had been settled
or resolved by Markman II.
126. See David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents,
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
127. FED. CIR. R. 36.
128. There are two Rule 36 cases for which there is insufficient information to determine
whether claim construction was at issue on appeal; one is from 1991, and the other is from 1993.
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As discussed further in Part III.A infra, it is important to recognize
that because of the significant difficulty in locating Rule 36 opinions,
most studies of claim construction reversal rates omit these opinions
from their data sets, artificially raising their reported reversal rates.'2 9
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This part sets forth the empirical results of the present study,
reporting the reversal rate before and after Markman and Cybor.
Before doing so, it recounts the results of prior empirical research
into the post-Markman reversal rate.
A. Prior Empirical Literature on the
Post-Markman Reversal Rate
The claim construction reversal rate has been extensively
studied by scholars.'" Nearly all of the previous studies begin their
analysis on or after the date of the Supreme Court's Markman I
decision in 1996."' There do not appear to be any empirical studies
of the claim construction reversal rate before the Federal Circuit's
Markman I decision in 1995.132
See Layh v. Cronk, 1993 WL 113716 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Four Seasons Solar Prods. Corp. v. Cal.
Solariums, Inc., 1991 WL 185048 (Fed. Cir. 1991). These cases were not included in the study.
129. Kimberly Moore's pair of empirical articles on claim construction reversal rates includes
Rule 36 decisions. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-10 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Are District Court
Judges Equipped]; Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction
More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 231, 234-38 (2005) [hereinafter Moore, Markman
Eight Years Later].
130. These are discussed in Richard S. Gruner's article How High Is Too High?: Reflections
on the Sources and Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 981, 994-1001 (2010).
131. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 19, at 203-08; Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1078, 1092 (2007);
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 129, at 8-9; Moore, Markman Eight
Years Later, supra note 129, at 239; Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim
Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 235 (2007). Several of the studies begin with
Markman L See Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study
Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711
(2003).
132. In a speech, Judge Randall Rader apparently indicated that he had reviewed over one
hundred Federal Circuit decisions before Markman I and found that there was a 39 percent
reversal rate. Robert C. Weiss, Armand F. Ayazi & Kate Hertel, Markman Practice, Procedure
and Tactics, in PATENT LITIGATION 2000, at 134 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 619, 2000). I was unable to locate any other article
describing these results in more detail.
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In general, the Federal Circuit reverses a seemingly high number
of district court claim construction decisions. A previous study using
a subset of the data used in the present study found that from 1996
through 2007, 29.7 percent of appeals from district courts involving
claim construction were reversed, vacated, and/or remanded in such
a way that vacated the judgment.33 In addition to this 29.7 percent, in
another 8.3 percent of cases, the court found a claim construction
error by the district court but nonetheless affirmed the decision.'34
District court judges with larger and smaller patent dockets were
reversed at approximately the same rate.'3 1 Surprisingly, the
administrative judges at the International Trade Commission did not
perform significantly better. From 1996 through 2008, 31 percent of
appeals from the International Trade Commission involving claim
construction were reversed, vacated, and/or remanded.136 It does not
appear that more experience with patent cases reduces the reversal
rate. Previous studies suggest several possible-and not mutually
exclusive-explanations for the seemingly intractable reversal rate:
(1) trial judges (including federal district court judges and the
administrative law judges of the International Trade Commission)
cannot master claim construction, especially without a technical
background; (2) the Federal Circuit's claim construction caselaw is
poorly articulated; and (3) claim construction is often inherently
indeterminate because of the difficulty of using words to describe
complex technological inventions.3 1
District court judges have voiced concerns about the claim
construction reversal rate. For example, District Court Judge Patti
Saris noted that the claim construction reversal rate has demoralized
some district court judges.13 Indeed, District Court Judge Marsha J.
133. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 249.
134. Id. at 248-49. For the federal appellate courts, the overall reversal rate was under 13
percent for civil nonprisoner appeals in 2007. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 113
tbl.B-5 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/B05Sep07.pdf
(listing appellate reversal rates for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007).
135. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 255-56.
136. Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 123, at 1716 tbl.II.
137. Id. at 1704; Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 267.
138. Kathleen M. O'Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671, 682
(2004).
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Pechman seemed to be demoralized when she said, "You get
reversed 37 percent of [the] time; you might as well throw darts."l39
Even judges on the Federal Circuit have acknowledged that district
court judges complain about the claim construction reversal rate.'40
B. Data on Claim Construction Before Markman
Relying on the data set described in Part II, I calculated the
claim construction reversal rate before Markman L 4 1 The reversal
rates for various periods are set forth in figure A.'42
FIGURE A
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REVERSAL RATE BY TIME PERIOD
Jan. 1991- Markman I- Markman II Cybor- Phillips-
Markman I Markman II -Cybor Phillips Dec. 2008
(Apr. 1995) (Apr. 1996) (Mar. 1998) (July 2005)
139. Anandashankar Mazumdar, Federal District Courts Need Experts That Are Good
"Teachers, " Judges Tell Bar, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 536 (Sept. 16, 2005).
140. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(noting the problem in claim construction of "a steadily high reversal rate"); Merck & Co. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader J., dissenting) (noting that the
Federal Circuit "often hears criticism from district court judges that its reversal rate on claim
construction issues far exceeds that of other circuit courts").
141. See supra Part II.
142. As mentioned in the Introduction, descriptive information is provided in this Article.
Additional and more robust analysis of the data will be presented in a future article.
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As shown in figure A, the rate between January 1991 and
Markman I was 20.8 percent, that between Markman I and Markman
II was 17.7 percent, that between Markman II and Cybor was 26.2
percent, that between Cybor and Phillips was 32.1 percent, and that
between Phillips and the end of December 2008 was 28.0 percent.143
In terms of raw percentages, the reversal rates were higher for the
periods after Markman I and Markman II than before.
The claim construction reversal rate is perhaps more easily
viewed in a line graph. As shown in figure B, the reversal rate varies
from one year to the next, and there has not been a downward trend
over time.'"
FIGURE B
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REVERSAL RATE
1991-2008
Markman I Cybor Festo Phillips
80 (1995) (1998) (2000) 
(2005)
70
60
a 50
40_
20 -
20-
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143. The reversal rates illustrated in figure A represent the entire population of district court
appeals during each given time period. The number of observations for each period is 159, 62,
107, 644, and 318, respectively.
144. Figure B presents a forty-observation trailing moving average of the reversal rate. A
trailing moving average is a rolling arithmetic average, in this case of the previous forty
observations. Significant decisions are marked by vertical lines.
Cumulative Number of Appellate Decisions
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From 1991 through 2008, 28.5 percent of appeals from district
courts involving claim construction were reversed, vacated, or
remanded.145 In another 6.6 percent of the cases, the Federal Circuit
found a claim construction error by the district court but nonetheless
affirmed.'46 Of note, the reversal rate for 2008 was 37.5 percent.'4 7
As discussed in Part V, the shift after Markman I to judicial
claim construction may influence the types of cases brought on
appeal. In other words, the shift of claim construction to the judge
may affect which lawsuits reach the stage of appellate resolution and
which are settled or dropped. With that concern set aside for a
moment, the overall reversal rate clearly increased after Markman
H.148
145. The rate from Markman II through 2007 was almost the same, 29.7 percent. Schwartz,
Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 249.
146. Each summary affirmance/Rule 36 decision is an affirmance (the district court's ruling is
affirmed), and consequently the claim construction did not require the case to be reversed,
vacated, and/or remanded. However, the calculation of cases with a claim construction error is
more difficult. It is impossible to ascertain the Federal Circuit's view on the disputed claim
construction for many summary affirmances. In appeals in which a party alleges that the district
court erred on multiple grounds, it is impossible to ascertain upon which ground(s) the Federal
Circuit affirmed. Because there is no written opinion, it is possible that the Federal Circuit elected
to affirm the opinion on a basis not related to claim construction and would have revised the
claim construction if the Federal Circuit wrote a written opinion. As there is no indication in the
record that the Federal Circuit found a claim construction error, these cases were not tabulated as
cases with an error. Separately, as a point of reference for reversal rates, an extremely thorough
study of 2008 decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals found a 25.52 percent reversal rate for
cases involving de novo review. Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1434742. Professor Yung's study
did not include summary affirmances. To provide a more apples-to-apples comparison with
Professor Yung's study, Professor Yung graciously provided me with the civil de novo reversal
rate for 2008 using his study's search terms. Across all of the regional circuits, the reversal rate
was 26.6 percent. I conducted an analogous search incorporating Professor Yung's search query
for claim construction cases in the Federal Circuit. I used Professor Yung's method for content
analysis and his coding methodology. With that method, the claim construction reversal rate was
48.5 percent, almost double the rate of the regional circuit courts on civil de novo-reviewed
issues.
147. This figure comes from my data set and is based upon all appeals, including summary
affirmances.
148. This result is statistically significant. The following hypotheses can be rejected with
confidence (p=0.003): there is no difference in the proportion of appeals affirmed before
Markman and between Markman and Cybor; there is no difference in the proportion of appeals
affirmed before Markman and between Cybor and Festo; there is no difference in the proportion
of appeals affirmed before Markman and between Festo and Phillips; and there is no difference in
the proportion of appeals affirmed before Markman and after Phillips.
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Table 1 breaks out the pre-Marknan I reversal rate based upon
the procedural posture of the district court case being reversed.
TABLE 1
PRE-MARKMANIREVERSAL RATES BY PROCEDURAL DISPOSITION
Procedural Posture Reversal Rate Number of Appellate
(%) Decisionsl49
Preliminary Injunction 16.7% 12
Summary Judgment 19.0% 58
Jury Trial 27.0% 37
Bench Trial 20.5% 44
The number of observations is quite low for the category of
preliminary injunction (12) and somewhat low for the category of
jury trial (37).1' For that reason, I did not perform a statistical
analysis of the differences. 15 In raw numbers, the reversal rate after
trial by jury is about 8 percent higher than the reversal rate on
summary judgment.
After Cybor, the Federal Circuit reviewed all claim construction
opinions without any deference to the district court's findings. 15 2
Before Cybor, the Federal Circuit was not always clear as to the
149. In addition to the results set forth in table 1, there were three appellate decisions which
involved other procedural postures (two appeals from contempt proceedings, and one from a
hearing before a Special Master), and three other appellate decisions for which the procedural
posture could not be ascertained.
150. There were also two appeals from contempt hearings and a handful of cases in which the
procedural posture from the district court could not be obtained. Those appeals are not reported
in table 1.
151. Because the numbers represent the entire population, the differences represent the
absolute and actual disparities for this time frame.
152. Bey & Cotropia, supra note 17, at 290 ("Since its decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit has upheld the de novo standard of review for district
court interpretations of issued claims.")
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standard of review it employed. In twenty-two opinions from 1991
until 1998, the Federal Circuit expressly stated it was reviewing
claim construction under a "clearly erroneous" standard of review.'
In twenty of these opinions (90.9 percent), the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's claim construction. Because there are
fewer than twenty-five opinions reviewed under a deferential
standard, not much can be said about them empirically. Furthermore,
the twenty-two opinions were not randomly generated; the Federal
Circuit judges on those panels may have been predisposed to affirm.
Interestingly, there are numerous cases in the same 1991-1998 time
period that do not explicitly identify the standard of review for claim
construction.1 54 These pre-Cybor cases omit any mention of whether
review was de novo or at least somewhat deferential. It is impossible
to ascertain from content analysis of the opinions themselves what
standard the court applied.
153. The following twenty-two cases were reviewed under a deferential standard of review:
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wiener v.
NEC Elecs., 102 F.3d 543 (Fed Cir. 1996); King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Salt Lake Brine Shrimp v. Sanders Brine Shrimp Co., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 14255
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Tielemen Food Equip. v. Stork Gamco, 56 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Comair
Rotron, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 18325 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Gaska Tape, Inc. v. Pres-On
Prods., Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10912 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc.,
997 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Morton Int'l v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
FMT Corp, Inc. v. Nissei ASB Co., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19895 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Altech
Controls Corp. v. PLT Controls, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12927 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Drexelbrook Controls, Inc. v. Endress + Hauser, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1915 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 19639 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Charles Greiner & Co., Inc. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc. Patent Litigation, 982 F.2d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Gencor Indus. v. Standard Havens Prods., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v.
Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-
Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Siemens-Elema AB v. Puritan-Bennett Corp., 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
154. See, e.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. PPG Indus., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 227 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Rogers Living Trust v.
Baxter Int'l Inc., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28122 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Int'l Visual Corp. v. Crown
Metal Mfg., 991 F.2d 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d
1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Ernster v. Ralston Purina Co., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26507 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp.,
952 F.2d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Spring 2010] 1097
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1073
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This Article reports new data on the Federal Circuit reversal rate
from just before the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman through
the end of 2008. The pre-Markman reversal rate was lower in
absolute terms than the current claim construction reversal rate.
Further empirical analysis is required, which should include
regressions for various control variables. Until that analysis is
complete, there are several possible explanations for this difference.
Before delving too far into the implications, note that caution
should be used in comparison of the reversal rates before and after
Markman. Studying the time period surrounding a major change such
as Markman presents difficulties. For example, the types of cases
that survived until an appellate decision may have changed across
this period. When claim construction was performed by a jury, more
accused infringers may have settled instead of risking a jury ruling."'
After Markman, it appears that accused infringers in similar cases
could more freely litigate claim construction before a judge. As more
courts began utilizing a completely separate claim construction
hearing, the number of litigants willing to proceed through claim
construction may have increased."' In essence, this limitation is a
selection effects concern, although slightly different from the 50
percent "closest case" hypothesis, which is discussed in more detail
in Part V. For these reasons, the types of cases that resulted in a
Federal Circuit decision may be different before and after Markman.
As for implications of the present study, some may assert that
the reason for a lower reversal rate for claim constructions before
Markman I is obvious. Juries decided claim construction in a black
box manner, and the Federal Circuit did not have a concrete claim
construction to review on appeal. Consequently, the argument goes,
the Federal Circuit had little choice but to affirm because of the lack
of a written claim construction record. However, the appellate briefs
in the pre-Markman jury cases belie this view. Those briefs
presented issues for appeal that directly challenged claim
construction by stating that particular claim terms were either
155. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 389, 395 (2000).
156. See Chu, supra note 131, at 1083.
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missing from or present in the accused device, arguing for reversal
on that basis. The appellate briefing in these early cases made the
same arguments based on the canons of claim construction that are
present in modem-day claim construction appeals. Additionally,
claim construction issues were raised as central issues in the older
appeals, not as peripheral or throw-in issues. Thus, the black box
nature of some pre-Markman decisions alone does not explain the
results.
Furthermore, as shown in table I, the pre-Markman reversal rate
for appeals from jury trials was about 8 percent higher than the
reversal rate for appeals from summary judgment and bench trials.
The Federal Circuit in some instances officially extended deference
to bench and jury trial determinations on extrinsic evidence used in
claim construction.157 If jury trials inherently result in fewer
reversals, then the jury trial reversal rate should be lower than both
the summary judgment and bench trial rates.' But it is not. The pre-
Markman reversal rate from jury trials is in line with the average
reversal rate for all claim construction appeals over the past
seventeen years.
A second implication worth noting is that shifting claim
construction authority from the jury to the judge may have resulted
in different case selection effects. As previously noted, the theory is
that different cases reached an appealable judgment once a jury was
removed from claim construction. The requirement to litigate
through a jury trial undoubtedly encouraged some lawsuits to settle.
It may have been that only the closest and fiercest disputes reached
appellate resolution before Markman L After Markman, and
especially after the rise of separate Markman hearings, litigants were
free to pursue a case through claim construction and still settle before
trial. Moreover, the district court itself could resolve easier cases via
summary judgment after claim construction. However, if judicial
claim construction permits more appeals of easier cases, we should
expect the post-Markman reversal rate to be lower.
157. See Brian Michael Martin, Federal Circuit Limits Jury's Role in Patent Trials, 77 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 641, 642-43 (1995).
158. As discussed in Part V, infra, the selection effects theory may predict that the summary
judgment reversal rate is lower than the trial reversal rate. The pre-Markman data are consistent
with this prediction.
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Third, it could be that the claim construction reversal rate is
constant because of litigation selection effects. Some law-and-
economics approaches suggest that the reversal rate should be
relatively constant over time because litigants will always settle all
but the closest cases.' The fluctuations in the reversal rate over time
shown in figure B undercut this explanation. The reversal rate has
varied by over 100 percent, with it being as low as below 20 percent
and as high as over 40 percent in a given year. To be fair, the
reversal rate before Markman I is not dramatically lower than that
immediately after Markman. It also fluctuated, although not as much
as the post-Markman reversal rate. Furthermore, the time period
before Markman considered in the present study is only about four-
and-a-half years, while the period after Markman is almost fifteen
years. A study including a longer period before Markman may be
beneficial.
Some may argue that these fluctuations are the result of changes
in the types of patents, in the parties to patent litigation, or in the
nature of patent litigation. For example, it is believed that suits by
nonpracticing entities increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s.'60
The complexity of patents and patent claims may have increased.16 '
Perhaps related to this change in complexity, the quantity of patent
litigation involving software and business method patents also
increased during the time period of the study.'6 2 Furthermore, lawyers
and law firms willing to handle patent cases on a contingency basis
increased during roughly the same time period.' These causes
cannot be definitively ruled out at this point. Then again, the reversal
rate fluctuated both up and down, and these fluctuations do not seem
to correlate with such changes. The increase in business method and
software patents likely occurred in the early to mid-2000s. The
increase in the reversal rate predates these developments.
159. See Gruner, supra note 130, at 985, 1050-51, 1052.
160. See Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, Comment, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 295 (2007).
161. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 79 (2002).
162. Id. at 88 n.35.
163. Paul Lansing, Michael Fricke & Suzanne Davis, The Ethics of Contingent Fees in Legal
Service Businesses, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 301, 311 (2009).
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Fourth, it could be that the claim construction reversal rate for
similarly situated cases increased after Markman. Claim construction
is frequently raised on appeal, and its reversal rate is higher than that
for most other issues in patent law.164 If this is true, it is possible that
patent law has not become more predictable by removing
responsibility for claim construction from the jury. Of course, a
confounding factor is the de novo standard of review for all claim
construction appeals. Furthermore, claim construction is but one
piece in patent law, and the reversal rate does not explain the entire
picture. Yet, it provides one measure of predictability.
V. THOUGHTS ON SELECTION EFFECTS IN PATENT LITIGATION
In this part, I briefly present several observations about the
selection effects theory as it relates to patent litigation. These
remarks are not limited to the pre-Markman period and are meant to
supplement the articles in this symposium issue by Professors Ted
Sichelman and Richard Gruner, which also address potential
selection effects.
Some law-and-economics literature, including Professor
Gruner's article, suggests that the appealed cases should always be
the closest cases."' One theory is that settlement means that the
parties overlapped in their expectations of success on the merits.
According to this theory, the parties will settle all but the closest
cases at some stage, whether before a lawsuit is brought, before a
trial court ruling, or before an appellate court ruling. Because claim
construction is a central issue in a majority of appeals decisions on
the merits, such an approach suggests that claim construction appeals
should be resolved with a 50 percent reversal rate. Deviations from
164. Ted Sichelman, The Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1161, 1172-73 (2010).
165. Gruner, supra note 130, at 1008-09; Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra
note 129, at 10; George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-17 (1984). Other empirical studies have reported plaintiff win rates in
patent jury trials at nearly 70 percent, contrary to what one would expect using the limiting case
of the Priest/Klein economic theory. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 155, at
385-86; see also Alan C. Marco, The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent Litigation:
Evidence from Trials, 4 ToPics ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 34-35, 42 (2004) (reporting that
there does not appear to be a selection bias tending to produce a 50 percent patent infringement
win rate but that there does appear to be a selection bias toward 50 percent in the validity win
rate).
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this rate may result from a variety of factors, including (1)
asymmetric stakes, costs, and risk profiles; (2) agency costs; (3)
endowment effects; and (4) other complicating factors.166 There are
reasons to doubt that this selection effects approach completely
explains the reversal rate, given the complexities of real-world patent
litigation.
Selection effects should be considered at the three stages
previously mentioned: before a lawsuit has been filed, during
pendency at the trial court, and on appeal. Turning to the first stage,
it is practically impossible to evaluate the disputes that never resulted
in lawsuits. Presumably, those cases include some easier disputes
and ones in which the amounts in controversy made litigation
untenable. For a brief moment, I will skip an analysis of selection
effects between the time of the filing of a lawsuit and the entry of an
appealable judgment in the district court. With respect to appellate
outcomes in civil litigation in general, there is little if any evidence
that the 50 percent theory holds, regardless of the win rate at the trial
court.167 The annual civil reversal rate in the federal appellate court
system is nowhere near 50 percent for any federal appellate court.168
166. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919,
1951-56 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont, Redux]; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 137-40 (2002) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg,
Litigation Realities]; Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations
from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25
J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 237, 242-48 (1996).
167. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, supra note 166, at 151.
168. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 111-14 tbl.B-5 (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/appendices/BO5Sep08.pdf (listing appellate reversal rates
by circuit for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 113-16 tbl.B-5 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/
appendices/BO5SepO7.pdf (listing appellate reversal rates by circuit for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2007); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 130-33 tbl.B-5 (2007),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendicesIb5.pdf (listing appellate reversal
rates by circuit for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2006); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 126-29 tbl.B-5 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/
appendices/b5.pdf (listing appellate reversal rates by circuit for the fiscal year ending September
30, 2005); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 100-03 tbl.B-5 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b5.pdf (listing appellate reversal rates by circuit
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004).
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Furthermore, once a final, appealable judgment has been entered,
most cases involving claim construction disputes are appealed.169 The
cost of appeal is low compared with the amount in dispute and the
cost of litigating in the district court. The average cost of litigating a
high-value patent infringement claim through the close of discovery
is greater than $6 million.o Rational litigants do not spend that sort
of money on legal fees without the potential for a significant
monetary recovery or a valuable injunction. Typical appeals cost at
least an order of magnitude less than trial court litigation."' An
appellate reversal of claim construction normally flips the result by
the trial court.'72 For example, a different claim construction usually
reverses a jury verdict of infringement 3  or vacates a grant of
summary judgment of noninfringement.'7 4 An appeal of a final
169. Data on appeal rates in general are difficult to obtain. In contrast to reversal rates, appeal
rates cannot be gleaned merely from reviewing written opinions. The district court dockets
themselves must be reviewed. From these dockets, one must determine whether the case was in
condition for an appeal, typically requiring the entry of final judgment. Even if summary
judgment of noninfringement has been granted, the judgment is not necessarily appealable. See,
e.g., Int'l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 476 F.3d 1329, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(dismissing appeal of summary judgment of noninfringement for lack of jurisdiction because the
district court's judgment was not final). Before a judgment is final, either all of the claims and
counterclaims must be resolved or the district court must make a determination under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). In short, it is difficult to ascertain which cases are appealable, a
critical component in calculating appeal rates. The existing appeal rates data are sparse and of
unknown reliability. The data support a patent appeal rate much above the average for all civil
litigation but less than 100 percent. Compare Thomas H. Cohen, When Is the Verdict or
Judgment Final? An Examination of Post-Trial Activity in Civil Litigation 10 (July 10, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=
1432567 (reporting an 18 percent appeal rate after civil trials in state courts in 1995), with
REBECCA N. EYRE, JOE S. CECIL & ERIC TOPOR, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION: A SURVEY OF
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 23 (2008), http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/patclaim.pdf
(reporting that 71 percent of patent cases resolved by summary judgment or jury trial were
appealed), and Mary A. Woodford, Vice President, Cornerstone Research, Presentation to Ropes
& Gray LLP, Preliminary Analysis of IPLC Data: Patent Infringement Cases 33-39 (June 2009)
(reporting approximately 50 percent of all patent cases are appealed).
170. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-129 (2009). This figure does not include
the substantial nonmonetary costs of patent litigation. See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent
Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 29-30 (2007).
171. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped, supra note 129, at 10 ("[A]ppeal
transaction costs are relatively low compared to the trial costs.").
172. See Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 249 tbl.4 (reporting that in 80
percent of the cases with claim construction errors, the case was reversed, vacated, or remanded).
173. See, e.g., Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (reversing an award over $100,000,000 due to erroneous claim construction).
174. See, e.g., Symantech Corp. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
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judgment is the norm because of the combination of (1) the low cost
of appeal; (2) the high dollar amount in dispute; and (3) the potential
for a reversal of fortune in the event the Federal Circuit reverses (and
the well-known high claim construction reversal rate).' If litigants
rationally settled patent disputes, we would expect to see a large
number of settlements after a notice of appeal has been filed,
especially after appellate briefing and oral argument.'76 At that point,
the issues in dispute have been narrowed, and the parties should be
able to more accurately predict outcomes. However, while hard data
are not presently available, the anecdotal evidence suggests that there
are almost no settlements during this time period in patent cases. 17
Second, turning back to proceedings before the trial court, there
is debate within the academy regarding the correctness of this
particular sort of law-and-economics theory.'7 ' The most basic
formulation of the selection effects theory-the 50 percent
hypothesis-does not hold in many areas of law,179 including in
patent litigation.' But there is ongoing empirical debate about the
correctness of a modified selection effects theory to take into account
differential stakes, parties' misperceptions, and other information
asymmetries.'' The parties in patent cases have different stakes
depending upon the issue. For example, in many cases, a patentee is
harmed more by a finding of invalidity than by one of
noninfringement. This is because an invalid patent cannot be asserted
175. While the data on appeal rates are sparse, the appeal rate does not appear to be near 100
percent. Perhaps delays in entering a final, appealable judgment encourage parties to settle.
Further investigation into appeal rates is warranted.
176. See Gruner, supra note 130, at 1034-35, 1042.
177. See Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 243-44 n.127.
178. See Moore, supra note 155, at 376 n.51.
179. See Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339-40 (1990) (concluding that the refined
Priest/Klein hypothesis "can be rejected as a description of all civil litigation" but that it may
accurately describe products liability litigation).
180. See Scott Woloson, Patent Verdicts from 1-1-05 to 1-11-2010, http://www.patstats.org/
Verdicts%20to_10_2_09.xls (reporting a 75 percent patentee win rate at trial from 2005 until
2009).
181. See Clermont, Redux, supra note 166, at 1966; Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel,
Toward a Taxonomy ofDisputes: New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28
J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 130 (1999) ("Our conclusions are mixed. While our three-parameter version
of the Priest/Klein model fits the pattern of independent evidence for three or four of the case
types, the estimates it yields are not consistent for the other two .... .").
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against anyone, while a noninfringed patent can be asserted against
other products and other parties. 8 2 Thus, patentees may settle more
often to avoid rulings on invalidity than on noninfringement,
especially for patents of questionable validity. Furthermore, in many
cases, an injunction harms the infringer more than it benefits the
patentee.' These differences and others are hard to model and are
deviations from the limiting instance of the case selection theory.
Settlement is often difficult to achieve during the pendency of
patent cases in district court.184 For example, there are uncertainties
related to patent damages. It is not uncommon for the parties' trial
damages positions to vary by one and sometimes even two orders of
magnitude. On the other hand, there are often huge transaction costs,
including attorneys' fees, involved in litigating a patent dispute. The
large transaction costs alone may make settlement possible, even
when the amount in dispute is in the millions of dollars. While many
patent cases settle, I am skeptical that a great percentage of patent
disputes settle because the parties overlap in their expectations on
claim construction.
Third, the existing empirical evidence about selection bias in
claim construction appeals does not support a strong effect.
Specifically, the appeal rate of district court judges who were
reversed substantially more often (and less often) than average were
roughly in line with the appeal rate of all district court judges."' A
selection effects theory predicts that parties appeal more often from
opinions from inaccurate judges and settle more often from opinions
from accurate judges."' The empirical evidence to date, while
somewhat scant, undercuts this proposition. Some may argue that
182. Collateral estoppel applies to a finding of invalidity. See Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964, 987 (1975). But it does not apply to a finding of
noninfringement. Alan Devlin, The Stochastic Relationship Between Patents & Antitrust, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 75, 92 (2009).
183. See Moore, supra note 155, at 378 n.62.
184. David C. Berry, Harnessing the "Sport of Kings": Using Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements to Control Discovery in Patent Disputes, 9 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 1,
3 (2006) ("[T]he stakes in patent litigation often involve competitor access to the marketplace
(sometimes with international ramifications) rather than simply payment of damages, making it
more difficult for patentees and their competitors to reach a financial compromise in order to
settle disputes early in the litigation process.").
185. See Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 123, at 282-84.
186. See Gruner, supra note 130, at 1009-10.
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litigants do not have data on which district court judges are "better"
or "worse" at claim construction and therefore make their best
estimate before attempting to settle. However, there are reasons to be
skeptical that litigants, especially in the busy patent districts, do not
know which judges are better or worse at construing claims,
especially after the judge construes the claims in their case. The truth
may be that unsuccessful patent litigants always believe that an error
was made in their case, even if the claim construction was performed
by the most accurate judge. Thus, the rational-actor assumption in
the selection effects theory may not completely hold true in real-
world patent litigation.
Fourth, as Professor Ted Sichelman notes in another article in
this issue, relative to other appealed patent law issues, claim
construction reversal rates are among the highest.' If selection
effects are driving appeals, then one would expect all issues that can
be appealed to the Federal Circuit to have similarly high reversal
rates. However, it is only claim construction and a few other
doctrines-several of which are related to claim construction, such as
indefiniteness-that top the charts.'" The doctrines with a greater
than average reversal rate are not only those reviewed de novo but
also those typically reviewed with deference, such as damages
(including both reasonable royalties and lost profits). And litigants
are acutely aware of the claim construction reversal rate.
Consequently, litigants frequently select claim construction as an
issue on appeal, as long as they can make a plausible argument.'
This frequency should increase the number of weak claim
construction appeals relative to other patent law issues on appeal,
and these weak appeals should result largely in affirmances. Thus,
187. Sichelman, supra note 164, at 1177 figs.2-3.
188. Id. at 1174-75. Indefiniteness is really another form of a claim construction dispute. An
indefiniteness dispute typically involves the patentee arguing for one construction of a claim term
and the accised infringer arguing that no construction is possible. In my coding, I included these
disputes as claim construction disputes. Consequently, the claim construction reversal rates I
report include most or all of the indefiniteness cases Sichelman separately reports.
189. Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH L. REV.
215, 252 n. 95 (2008) ("[A]s the issue became more visibly contentious, parties likely featured
claim construction more often in appeals."); cf Brian Z. Tamanaha, Devising Rule of Law
Baselines: The Next Step in Quantitative Studies of Judging (Feb. 4, 2010) (Duke Law Journal-
Online Edition; Washington U. School of Law Paper No. 10-02-02), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1547981 (reporting that in the average federal appellate
case (i.e., nonpatent), only 10-15 percent involve hard or uncertain issues).
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the true differences in reversal rates may be even higher than shown
by Sichelman's article.
While there are grounds to be doubtful that selection effects are
the primary cause of the seemingly high claim construction reversal
rate, selection effects cannot be dismissed out of hand. A large body
of theoretical literature is based upon rational litigant behavior with
respect to settlement. Like disputes in all areas of civil litigation,
most patent disputes settle before final judgment in a district court.'o
To be fair, at least some settlements are likely because the parties
overlap in their expectations of results on claim construction. Further
empirical research into this topic is sorely needed.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents new evidence on the claim construction
reversal rate before Markman. The data show that the reversal rate
was somewhat lower before Markman. There are several possible
explanations for the difference, including the shift of claim
construction responsibility from the jury to the judge, which resulted
in different case selection effects on appeal. According to this
explanation, the Markman revolution had modest effects that only
seem larger on appeal. Alternatively, the higher reversal rate may
have been caused by Markman. Because of the variety of
explanations and relative paucity of data, further research is
warranted on whether claim construction has become less predictable
since Markman. Evaluating this question requires more data and
more sophisticated empirical models that control for potential
explanatory variables. Until such definitive analysis is available, the
best understanding is that the claim construction reversal rate is
unduly high and has generally been increasing in the last fifteen
years.
190. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Examination
of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 237, 272 (2006).
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